This article introduces a previously-unnamed class of Windows vulnerability that demonstrates the dangers of assumption and describes some unintended security consequences.
TL;DR: Things are written to assume that files opened exclusively cannot change. Windows enforces that write protection on files in the filesystem driver. If you open a file over a network from a non-Windows filesystem, that assumption may not be valid.
This allows an attacker to abuse paging to have the system validate a correctly-signed file, then swap out the contents.
So because windows is the shit OS that can’t, now Linux has to work to “correct” this “problem”? I assume that’s how it will go down. Enshitification by compatibility to shitty OS.
No, because an attacker could still make their own network filesystem that does whatever they want. MS needs to update critical auth methods to not assume that the filesystem will play ball.
TL;DR: Things are written to assume that files opened exclusively cannot change. Windows enforces that write protection on files in the filesystem driver. If you open a file over a network from a non-Windows filesystem, that assumption may not be valid.
This allows an attacker to abuse paging to have the system validate a correctly-signed file, then swap out the contents.
So because windows is the shit OS that can’t, now Linux has to work to “correct” this “problem”? I assume that’s how it will go down. Enshitification by compatibility to shitty OS.
No, because an attacker could still make their own network filesystem that does whatever they want. MS needs to update critical auth methods to not assume that the filesystem will play ball.